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Summary findings
Luttmer uses instrumental variable methods and the  or spending is about 50 percent in Russia and about 20
decomposition of income into transitory and persistent  percent in Poland. But roughly half of these fluctuations
components to distinguish underlying income inequality  reflect measurement error or transitory shocks, so
and changes in poverty from the effects attributable to  underlying levels of income and spending are much more
measurement error or transitory shocks. He applies this  stable than the data suggest.
methodology to household-level panel data for Russia  *  The apparent  high levels of economic mobility are
and Poland in the mid-1990s. Luttmer finds that:  driven largely by transitory events and noisy data. After
* Accounting for noise in the data reduces inequality  transitory shocks are accounted for, about 80 percent of
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) by 10-45 percent.  the poor in both Russia and Poland remain in poverty for
*  Individuals in both countries face much economic  at least one year. So there is a real risk of an entrenched
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of ensuring health-care coverage of
rural and poor areas of developing countries. We focus primarily on the incentives facing
medical service providers and analyze them in light of recent developments in contract
theory. The approach is essentially theoretic but is motivated by experiences in several
countries in Asia, Eastern Europe and Southern Africa.
Since 1977 the international health community has put a great deal of emphasis on
ensuring universal access to basic primary care as a high priority for public action. 'While
the rationale for this emphasis is questionable,' we take this goal as given. In practice,
attempts to accomplish this goal have often been  disappointing. Reliance on the private
sector to put  trained  professionals in  such  areas is  not  warranted as  demand  for the
services at the true opportunity cost of the professional's  time is simply too low. State
intervention is obviously needed. On the other hand, public performance has met with, at
best,  variable  success.  Disappointment  stems  from  several  sources  but  a  common
problem is the inability to staff and supply medical posts in rural areas. High rates of
absenteeism  (blatant or  couched in  terms  of  attending meetings,  etc.),  high  rates  of
vacancies for postings, simple lack of conscientious or courteous care and frequent lack
of supplies such as essential drugs are common in many public facilities.
Why is it so hard to run public clinics? We usually assume in the analysis of public
expenditures that if the government wants a particular product or service, it simply pays
for it and the product appears. We can debate whether these services are appropriate, but
there is no ambiguity as to what is, in fact, purchased. 2 Here, however, we seem to face
an essential inability to purchase a particular service at all. Apparently it is difficult to
purchase medical services of agreed quality (including due diligence of effort, sufficient
attendance, etc.) even from civil servants.
These  problems  with  public  provision  do  not  necessarily  argue  in  favor  of
abandoning the goals of basic health care coverage for the poor but they do highlight the
fact that the costs of provision could be much higher than anticipated. The underlying
problem is one of providing physicians with incentives at reasonable cost. The rest of the
paper  examines  a  number  of  theoretic  models that  attempt to  solve  aspects of  this
problem. For most of the paper we will use the principal-agent framework in which the
government (principal) provides incentives to an agent (physician) through  an explicit
contractual arrangement, the terms of which will depend on, inter alia, the observability
of actions and outcomes. We will be particularly interested in the role of "high powered"
' See  Filmer et al. for a critique  of this approach  to health  care policy.
2 This is the essence of cost/benefit analysis or project evaluation - quantities are usually assumed to be a
technological given while intellectual attention focussed entirely on their valuation.
Iincentives and their limitations.  Some comments on the provision  of incentives when
contracts cannot be written or enforced conclude the paper.
As a point of departure, let us assume that the government can actually see and
contract for all relevant dimensions of health care. In this case, there is no  incentive
problem per se as it is possible to ensure that the wage at which the universality objective
is met will yield the expected services. The problem is that this level of wages may be
very  high - much higher than is likely to be  forthcoming in  any practical  sense. One
reason is the existence of greater earnings opportunities in richer, more urban areas of the
country. On top of this, of course, is the fact that medical personnel are generally much
better educated and potentially have higher incomes than the country average and tend to
want the amenities that go along with urban life. If they have families they will tend to
want  to give their children educational opportunities usually found in  cities. A recent
survey of medical personnel in Indonesia discovered that the anount  of money necessary
to  get them to relocate to the more remote areas of the country (generally away from
Java) was several multiples of actual wages. 3 At first glance, there does not appear to be a
problem of ineffective  incentives, but one of insufficient budget. There could well be
good,  economic,  reasons  for  insufficient  funds.  If  taxes  to  pay  for  government
expenditures  are  distortionary,  and  most  tax  systems  in  poor  countries  are  very
distortionary indeed, then there is an additional social cost of meeting the universality
objective. This gives a good reason to see if there is a way to reduce the overall cost of
provision by exploiting the design of contracts to doctors (see section 2).
At  the other extreme, we  can assume that  the government  can observe nothing
about physician performance - that is, it can't tell if there is a doctor in attendance in a
village at all much less if  she is charging (illegally if  a  public facility) or providing
conscientious care. This is something of a straw man but does raise one point. In this
case, a publicly  employed  doctor is  indistinguishable from  a  completely  unregulated
private  doctor (except that the public employee costs the government more). Except  in
idiosyncratic cases (such as a dedicated altruist or a doctor wanting to live in her home
village regardless of income) there is no reason to believe any of the poor areas will be
covered. Not only will it be costly to induce urban doctors to move (the constraint of the
preceding paragraph), but without performance incentives the real cost of services will
escalate dramatically.  One is then  left to wonder where, given the inherently high cost,
the desirability of universal provision comes from.
Intermediate within these extremes are cases in which some sort of information is
available or can be obtained at some cost, say by improved monitoring. In such cases we
will look at the tradeoff between improving performance with incentives and controlling
costs imposed by different information structures. Of course, incentives can be provided
3 Chomitz et al. (1998). Interestingly, they did find that promises of placement in graduate education would
induce doctors  to relocate.  However,  this seems  to depend  on a highly distorted,  non-transparent  system  of
graduate admissions, leverage that would disappear should medical education be reformed.
2to reflect measurement  error or to have relatively  small  effects on one's underlying
material  well-being (compared  to persistent  shocks),  it is interesting  to consider  the
inequality  and poverty dynamics  after income or consumption  has been purged of these
transitory  shocks. 2 Second,  we try to estimate  the variance  of measurement  error by
using instrumental  variables. With these estimates  of the importance  of measurement
error, one can then estimate  the inequality  in underlying  material well-being. Finally, wve
time-average  income or consumption  for families. By taking an average over a period of
time, measurement  error and transitory  shocks  will be partially  averaged  out (Shorrocks,
1978). This too, allows us to get a better estimate  of underlying  inequality.
The paper presents  three main findings. First, accounting  for noise in the data
substantially  reduces  inequality  measures. Since  this reduction is most pronounced  in
Russia, underlying  inequality  in these two countries  is more similar  than the uncorrected
inequality  measures  would suggest. Second,  individuals  in both countries  face much
economic  insecurity  - the median absolute  annual change  in income  or expenditure  is
around 50% in Russia and around 20% in Poland. However,  around half of these
fluctuations  reflect measurement  error or transitory  shocks. Hence,  underlying  income or
expenditure  levels are much more stable. Third, the apparent  high levels of economic
mobility  are largely driven by transitory  events and noisy data. After accounting  for
transitory  shocks,  around 80% of the poor in Russia  and Poland  remain in poverty for ELt
least one year.
2. A Fashion  Metaphor
Perhaps the following  metaphor can illustrate  the distinction  between  underlying
well-being and transitory  effects  on well-being. Imagine  that everyone  has a wardrobe
with seven outfits and we are interested  in "fashion" inequality. In the morning,
individuals  would  randomly  choose an item from their wardrobe. On a given day, we go
out and (perfectly)  measure the inequality  in the quality of clothes  that people are
2 To be sure,  transitory  shocks can have profound  effects  on welfare  too, especially  when families lack
formal or informal mechanisms  to smooth consumption.  In general,  however,  transitory shocks have less
3wearing  that day. The inequality  could  result from two sources. It could  reflect
underlying  inequality  - some people have wardrobes  with only nice clothes while  others
have wardrobes  with only old worn-out  clothes. Alternatively,  the measured inequality
could reflect idiosyncrasies  of individuals' choices  of what to wear that particular  day -
everybody  might have exactly  the same  wardrobe  at home, but some happen  to wear a
fancy  suit that day while others selected  their ragged  jeans. In practice, we would expect
the fashion inequality  we found that day to partly  reflect underlying  inequality  and to
partly reflect  idiosyncratic  events  of that day. The methodology  section explains  in detail
how these two sources  of inequality  can be distinguished  empirically.
In the metaphor above,  we assumed  perfect measurement  with regard  to the
quality of people's clothes. In practice,  however,  the interviewers  who rate the quality of
clothes may  make errors. The interviewers  may make mistakes  recording  the ratings or
may have different or changing  tastes. Hence,  two people wearing  exactly  the same
outfit may get different fashion  ratings,  or the same person  wearing  the same outfit on
two different days might get two different  ratings. Assume  that the interviewers  do not
make systematic  mistakes and that their mistakes  are unrelated  over time (alternatively,
in each period, a person's fashion quality gets rated by a randomly  chosen interviewer).
In this case, the mistakes  will lead to overestimates  of the true amount  of inequality  and
mobility. Even if everyone  wore exactly  the same  outfit, we would still find measured
inequality  and mobility  because  of the variation  in the interviewers'  ratings.
Suppose  we find someone  who got a good fashion  rating today but had always
received  poor fashion ratings  previously. What happened? Three things could have
happened. First, this person could have upgraded  his wardrobe. This would correspond
to a true increase in underlying  well-being. Second,  the wardrobe remained  the same, but
the individual  happened  to wear a particularly  nice outfit today. This would correspond
to a transitory shock. Third,  the individual  wore the same clothes  today as he had always
worn, but the interviewer  happened to be in a good mood and gave him an extraordinarily
nice rating. How can we distinguish  these  three events?
First, by looking  at future  ratings,  it is possible to distinguish  between a change in
underlying  well-being  (the quality of the wardrobe)  on the one hand, and transitory
profound  effects than permanent  ones.
4events  and measurement  error on the other  hand. If the wardrobe  had been upgraded,  Nve
would expect future  ratings on average to be as nice as today's. However,  if today's nice
rating  was caused  by an idiosyncrasy  or measurement  error, we would expect future
ratings to revert to the old, lower levels. Hence,  both transitory  events  and measurement
error would show  up as many  movements  up and down  the fashion  hierarchy  but all these
movements  would tend to be undone in the next period. This intuition  underlies the
procedure  that distinguishes  persistent  and transitory  shocks. This procedure is presented
formally  in the next section.
Second,  one might obtain three independent  measures  of the quality of a person's
outfit; for example  the outfit's price, age and the interviewer's  rating. If there were no
measurement  error, all three measures  would always  move in the same direction. We can
then find the measurement  error in each measure by seeing  how often  that measure
moves in a different  direction  than the other two. Once we know the amount  of
measurement  error in the interviewer's  ratings,  we can calculate  the likelihood  that an
increase  in the ratings was due to the person  wearing a nicer outfit. One can interpret  two
of the measures  of fashion quality as instruments  for the third measure. This instrumental
variables  procedure  is developed  formally in the next section.
3. Data and Methodology
Data
The data for Russia come from the Russian  Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey
(RLMS),  which is a nationally-representative  socioeconomic  survey of the Russian
Federation.  We use the panel component  of waves 5 through 8 which were fielded in the
falls of 1994, 1995, 1996  and 1998. This yields a sample  of 7,382 individuals  in 2,256
households  with complete  demographic,  income and expenditure  information. More
details about this dataset can be found on the website  of the University  of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill (www.cpc.unc/projects/rlms/project.html)  and in Lokshin and Popkin,
1998.
5The Polish data consists of the 1993-1996  panel component  of the Household
Budget  Survey conducted  by the Polish  Central Statistical  Office. The survey is fielded
throughout  the year. We used a balanced  panel with 16,552  individuals  in 4,919
households  with complete  demographic,  income  and expenditure  information. More
details of this dataset  can be found in Okrasa  (1999a,b).
Non-random  attrition  is a potentially  serious  problem. The University  of North
Carolina's website and Okrasa (1  999a) analyze  attrition  in each of the data sets. They
find that households  with better economic  positions and households  in urban areas are
more likely to drop out of the sample. It is hard to infer whether  and how this pattern of
attrition  affects the results.
The main measures  of economic  well-being  used in this paper are the logarithm of
monthly  consumption  expenditure  and the logarithm  of monthly  income. Both measures
are adjusted  for household  size using an equivalence  scale. 3 In the Polish data, the recall
period for all expenditure  items is one month,  while in the Russian  data recall periods
vary between  one week for food expenditure,  one month for services  and utilities, and
three months for clothes, shoes  and durables. The expenditure  data includes  actual
expenditure  on durables  rather than imputed  rental values  of these goods. Hence, one
might worry that finding  that most shocks  are transitory  largely reflects sporadic
purchases of durab 1es or other lumpy goods. To address  this concern,  the total analysis
was repeated  using only food expenditures,  which accounts  for 47% of total expenditure
in Russia and 42% of total expenditure  in Poland. The dynamics  of food expenditures  are
broadly  similar to those for total expenditure,  and a discussed  in more detail in the
sections  below.
The analysis  below is performed  on the whole sample as well as on subsamples
conditioned  on demographic  characteristics.  For the measurement  of shocks,  we take the
second  period of the 4 period  panel as the base period. Hence,  the base period is the fall
of 1995  in Russia and 1994  in Poland. Unless  otherwise  noted, demographic
characteristics  are measured  in the base period.
3We  use an equivalence parameter O of 0.75, i.e., equivalent size = (number of household members)0 75.
6A Model of Income and Expenditure Dynamics
Atkinson,  Bourguignon  and Morrisson  (1992)  and Birdsall  and Graham  (2000)
provide excellent  overviews  of the multitude  of techniques  used to examine  mobility  and
their interpretations. Many popular  mobility  measures,  such as transition  matrices,
compare  mobility across  two periods in time. Empirical  examinations  of mobility,
however, reveal that current  income movements  tend to be related  to past movements;  in
other  words, the mobility  process is not first-order  Markov  (Shorrocks,  1976). For
example,  a positive  transitory  shock first generates  upward  mobility  followed
immediately  by downward  mobility. In order to distinguish  between  movements that
persist and those that are undone in the following  period,  we first estimate a simple  model
of the income or expenditure  process. Next, we use this model  to calculate  traditional
mobility  measures  on the underlying  component,  which is the component  after transitory
shocks  have been removed.
A random  walk plus noise is a simple and popular  way of characterizing  an
expenditure  of income pattern that recognizes  both transitory  and persistent  shocks
(Friedman, 1957,  or Gottschalk  and Moffitt, 1993). The  model is phrased in terms of log
consumption  expenditure  but it is also applied to log income. Log consumption
expenditure  of individual  i in period  t, Cit  , consists  of an underlying  level, Cit*,  and a
transitory  shock (possibly  including  measurement  error),  sit:
(1)  Cit =Cit  +  it 
We define  the £-shocks  to be transitory  in the sense that only occur  for one period and are
unrelated  to past or future shocks. Conditional  on the underlying  level of consumption,
the transitory  shocks,  sit,  have mean zero and variance 2e,t.  Because transition
economies  are undergoing  a process of structural  change,  the variance  of the shocks  is
allowed  to vary over time. The underlying  component  of consumption  evolves subject  to
a common  trend, a 4 , and a persistent shock,  nit
(2)  Cit* =Ci,t*  +a4+flit
The trend, at, may vary over time but is the same for all individuals. The persistent
shocks,  init,  have an unconditional  mean of zero and variance  of &y,t.  We define
persistence  to mean that these shocks  last for at least 2 periods (possibly  longer,  but this
cannot be estimated  from 4-period  data without  functional  forn assumptions). The
7underlying  component  of consumption  reflects past persistent  shocks. Since  we allow
mean reversion  of persistent  shocks over periods beyond 2 years, persistent  shocks may
be correlated  with underlying  consumption.
The definition  of transitory  implies that the e-shocks  cannot be correlated  with
future  or past shocks:
(3a)  E[E 1t, ei,t-j] = 0  forj  # 0
(3b)  E[-jt,  i,t-j] = O forj #O
Because  persistent shocks  are defined to last at least two periods, they cannot  be undone
by next period's persistent shocks. Hence,  subsequent  persistent  shocks  must be
uncorrelated:
(4)  E[1lit, iU,t-i]  = 0
Finally, we use the identifying  assumption  that persistent  shocks are  uncorrelated  with
contemporaneous  temporary  shocks:
(5)  E[Ijit, Fit]  = °
While this assumption  cannot be tested, we will discuss  below to what extent the main
results hold if nlit  and Eit  are not uncorrelated.
Estimation
The model is estimated  on a four period  panel using the methods  of moments.
The moment conditions  for the variances  of the transitory  shocks  are identified  only for
the second and third period. To derive them, it is useful to first take first differences  of
log consumption  expenditure:
(6)  ACt =-  Cit - Ci,t  X= c4  + ilit + Fit  - ei,t-l
Since  all shocks  have mean zero,  the expectation  of AC,t  equals oct. Hence,  the covariance
between two consecutive  first differences  is:
(7)  Cov[ACi,t+i, ACI,t] = E[(Ii,t+l  + ei,t+l  - £ijt)(it + cit  - )] =  E[-s it] = -st,
where the second equal sign makes use of restrictions  (3), (4), and (5) above. The
intuition  is relatively simple:  the only shock  that two consecutive  first differences  have in
common  is the transitory  shock of the period in which the first differences  overlap.
8In a four period  panel, only the permanent  shock that occurs between  periods 2
and 3 is identified. Again the moment  condition  involves  a covariance  of 2 first
differences:
(8)  Cov[(Ci 4 - Ci ), (Ci 3 - Ci2)]  = E[(rii4 + 713 +TIi2 +Ei 4 - £il)(j3  + £j3 - P2)]
= E[il231  =  y2  n3,
where the second equal sign makes  use of restrictions  (3), (4), and (5) above. The
intuition  is quite straightforward:  the permanent  shock  between  periods 3 and 2 is the
only thing  that the shock between  period  4 and 1 and the shock between  period 3 and 2
have in common,  because they are subject  to different  transitory  shocks  (which are
uncorrelated).
With estimates  of &E2,  &2,3  and  23, the other main  parameters  can be estimated
easily. The variance  of underlying  consumption  in periods 2 and 3 is:
(9)  Var[Ci 2*] - 2C2* =  2C2  -22
(10)  Var[Ci3*] =&2C3*  = (2C3  (S2-3
where the variance  of Cit  is by &Ct.  The correlation  between  the persistent shock, rj3,
and the underlying  level of consumption,  CQ 2 , is:
(1 1)  p = (&C3O  - C2*  - &'rn3)/(2  Gr 13 OC2*)
Finally, the mean Cit  is denoted  by Pct. All standard  errors  are computed  by
bootstrapping  the sample 100  times.
Table 1 contains  the estimates  of this model  for log consumption  and log income
in Russia  and Poland. These  parameter  estimates  will  be used in the next section  to
simulate  the model. The main substantive  findings  will be discussed  in later sections
using the simulations. Nevertheless,  Table 1 gives a nice preview  of the findings. First,
the variance  of log consumption  or income is about  2 to 3 times higher  in Russia than iin
Poland, indicating  a more  unequal distribution  in Russia. Second,  the variance  of income
and consumption  shocks  is considerable  in both countries,  suggesting  high levels of
economic  insecurity. Third,  the variance  of the transitory  shocks  (&e3)  is much larger
than the variance of persistent  shocks (&23), indicating  that most of the shocks  will be
undone within 12  months. Because  the variance  of the transitory shocks  is a substantial
fraction of the cross-sectional  variance,  disregarding  the transitory  component  of income
9or consumption  substantially  reduces  our estimate of inequality. Disregarding  the
transitory  component  may be reasonable  since  many of the transitory shocks  likely reflect
4 measurement  error.
The four bottom  rows of table 1 explore  the sensitivity  of the estimate  of the
fraction  of persistent shocks  to the identifying  assumption  that contemporaneous
persistent and transitory  shocks  are uncorrelated. They show that a positive correlation
between  persistent and transitory  shocks  leads to an upward bias in the estimate  of the
fraction  of persistent shocks. 5 Hence, in this case, a larger  part of shocks  is transitory
than our estimate  shows. Moreover,  as long as the correlation  between  transitory  and
persistent shocks  takes on plausible  values (say between  -0.2 and 0.2), the bias in the
fraction  of persistent shocks  remains less than 4 percentage  points.
4 To alleviate  concerns  that the transitory  component  is largely  driven  by purchases of lumpy items  such as
durables,  we repeated the analysis  with food expenditure  instead of total expenditure  (see appendix  table
Al).  In Russia, log food expenditure  has a higher  variance  than log total  expenditure,  both cross-
sectionally  and over time, while in Poland  the opposite  is the case. The higher  variance  of food
expenditure  in Russia is probably  linked  to the short recall period  for food expenditure,  namely one week.
In both countries,  however,  the fraction of shocks  that are persistent is roughly as high for food expenditure
as total expenditure. Hence,  the highly  transitory  nature of expenditure  shocks cannot  be solely attributed
to occasional  purchases  of big-ticket items.
5  Assuming  that the covariance  between eit  and  rli, is constant  over time, the estimate  of the variance of
persistent shocks does not depend on the correlation  between  persistent and transitory shocks,  X. However,
the estimate of the variance  of transitory  shocks does depend  on this correlation.  Equation  (7) now
becomes:
(7')  Cov[ACi,, 1, ACj,j]  =  _2s,  - x Ce,t  ,t
This is a quadratic equation, which can be solved for (ye  ,
10Table 1: Parameter  Estimates
Russia 1994-1998  Poland  1993-1996
Parameter  Symbol  Consumption  Income  Consumption  Income
Means of logs
Period  I  tic  8.129  (0.018)  7.834  (0.022)  6.231  (0.007)  6.218  (0.008)
Period 2  VC2  7.940  (0.017)  7.530  (0.024)  6.173  (0.008)  6.210  (0.010)
Period 3  1 1c3  7.777  (0.020)  7.325  (0.031)  6.204  (0.007)  6.271  (0.009)
Period 4  ptC4  7.506  (0.020)  7.230  (0.022)  6.240  (0.007)  6.322  (0.010)
Variances of logs
Period  1  2c  0.678  (0.038)  0.736  (0.045)  0.227  (0.007)  0.335  (0.016)
Period 2  C
2 C2  0.623  (0.023)  0.970  (0.058)  0.239  (0.007)  0.355  (0.016)
Period 3  0
2C3  0.769  (0.038)  1.699  (0.090)  0.240  (0.007)  0.338  (0.018)
Period 4  &SC4  0.698  (0.029)  1.110  (0.065)  0.248  (0.007)  0.319  (0.014)
Variances offirst  diferences  of logs
Period 2-1  0
2AC2  0.678  (0.029)  1.138  (0.072)  0.174  (0.006)  0.321  (0.017)
Period  3-2  &2C3  0.686  (0.026)  1.801  (0.112)  0.154  (0.006)  0.294  (0.022)
Period 4-3  (32AC4  0.785  (0.033)  1.950  (0.117)  0.161  (0.007)  0.293  (0.023)
Decomposition  of shocks
Var[persistent  shock]  a213  0.059  (0.022)  0.130  (0.041)  0.022  (0.003)  0.028  (0.013)
Var[transitory  shock 2]  a2, 2 0.256  (0.022)  0.560  (0.066)  0.065  (0.004)  0.135  (0.012)
Var[transitoryshock3] 31  0.371  (0.025)  1.111  (0.092)  0.067  (0.004)  0.131  (0.019)
Derived estimates
Var[underlying  level 2]  (52c2-  0.367  (0.030)  0.409  (0.048)  0.174  (0.005)  0.220  (0.015)
Var[underlying  level 3]  20C3*  0.398  (0.031)  0.588  (0.056)  0.172  (0.006)  0.207  (0.015)
Correlation[C* 2,T13]  p  -0.094  (0.145)  0.106  (0.116)  -0.188  (0.047)  -0.265  (0.1.26)
Fraction persistent  0.137  (0.047)  0.105  (0.034)  0.244  (0.029)  0.178  (0.075)
Sensitivity of  "Fraction Persistent"  to the assumption that 77i,  and eit are uncorrelated.
Frac. persist. if corr[rlitt,  e]=  1.0  0.081  0.065  0.184  0.101
Frac. persist.  if corr[riit,  ,,]=  0.2  0.120  0.093  0.225  0.154
Frac. persist.  if corr[Tlit,  eq]= -0.2  0.159  0.119  0.268  0.210
Frac. persist.  if corrhNi, ej,l= -1.0  0.439  0.269  0.564  0.756
Note: All measures  are for equivalent  adults. The equivalence  scale  is household  size to the power  of 0.75 (0=0.75). Data consist  of
balanced  panels, 1993-1996  for Poland and 1994-1998  for Russia. Fraction  persistent  is the fraction  of the shock  between  period 2
and 3 that  is persistent. This  fraction  is defined  by the ratio of the  variance  of the  persistent  shock  to the  variance  of the  total shock
between  period 2 and 3.
Simulations
Because the variances of the transitory shocks for the first and last periods are not
identified, the paths of persistent and transitory income and expenditure &an  only be
simulated for periods 2 and 3.  While the estimation of the variances of the various
11shocks  did not rely on any distributional  assumptions,  the simulations  assume log normal
distributions  of shocks,  income and expenditure.
The log of persistent  consumption  for period 2 is simulated  by:
(12)  C2  N(gc2 ,6c 6-  )
where the tilde indicates  a simulated  variable  and the carets indicate estimated
parameters. The transitory  shock for period 2 is simulated  by:
(13)  E2 -N(O,&6)
and used to simulate  the log of total period 2 consumption:
(14)  C2 =C2 +E2
To allow  for correlation  with the level of persistent  consumption,  the persistent  shock is
simulated  by:
(15)  P2 =~  a  )+
C 2
where
(16)  S  N(O,(1-  _
2 )6&)
Persistent  consumption  in period  3 is found  by adding  the persistent shock  and the
time-trend  to persistent  consumption  in the previous period:
(17)  C3 -+  =  a  +&3
where & 3 =  3-  ACt.  Finally,  total consumption  is found  by adding  the transitory shock
for period 3:
(18)  C3 =  C 3 +e 3
where the transitory shock is simulated  by:
(19)  E3 - N(O, 6)
The results of the simulated  model are used in the next sections  to present  the main
findings.
Measurement Error and Instruments
Most researchers  recognize  that measured  equivalent  consumption  expenditure  is
only a rough proxy for the standard  of living  of a household. This raises the question  of
12whether  the differences  in equivalent  expenditure  reflect true differences  in the living
standards  of households  or whether  these differences  merely  reflect inaccuracies  of the
proxy. In principle,  this question  can be answered  if we can find two instruments  (see
also McCulloch  and Baulch,  2000). These instruments  need to be correlated  with
underlying  living standards,  but also need  to be uncorrelated  with measurement  error in
measured  equivalent  expenditure. The intuition  is simple:  common  movements  of all
three proxies indicate  changes  in the underlying  living standards  while the deviations  of
one proxy from the other  two indicates  measurement  error in this proxy. This
information  can then be used to calculate  movements  in the true living standards  as well
as the amount of measurement  error in each of the proxies.
More formally, let the true, but unobserved,  living standards  of household i be
denoted by Hi (say, for happiness). Consumption  expenditure,  C, is a noisy proxy for
living standards:
(20)  Cv  = Hi + ui
where u; is an error term that is uncorrelated  with Hi and that has a mean of zero and at
variance  of a2u. At this point, we cannot tell whether  movements  in C 1 are due to
movements  in true living  standards,  Hi, or simply  due to movements  in the error term ui.
Let the two additional  proxies for living standards  be denoted  by Xi and Yi,
where,
(21)  Xi = ao + aiHi + vi
(22)  Yi = Po  + ,lHi + wi
Both errors terms,  v; and wi, must be uncorrelated  with Hi. Their means are zero and
their variances  denoted  by a2, and a2w. Moreover,  all three proxies must be unrelated  in
the sense that their error terms are statistically  independent:  E[ui  vi.] = 0, E[ui  wi.]  = 0 and
E[v, w;]  = 0.
To find the variance  of underlying  living standards,  CF2H,  we first need to calculate
the covariances  between  the proxies:
(23)  Cov[C,, Xj]  (cx  = (XI OH
(24)  Cov[Ci,  Yi] -cY  = PI3  &H
(25)  Cov[X,,  YJ]  oxY  = al 1P  0
2 H
These three equations  are solved for &2H:
13(26)  &H  =  aCX  6TCY /  (
3XY
Finally, the fraction of the variance in measured equivalent consumption that is due to
measurement error is calculated as:
(27)  Fraction  measurement  error in C =  (&2C  - &H  ) / &C
The methodology to estimate the variance of changes in underlying living
standards is analogous:
(28)  &AH  =  OAC,AX  OAC,AY  / GAX,AY
where 6A,B  denotes the covariance between A and B.
The first instrument used is a measure of subjective living standards.  In the
Russian data, subjective living standards are measured by the question:  Please imagine a
9-step ladder where on the bottom, (thefirst  step), stand the poorest people, and on the
highest step, (the ninth), stand the rich.  On which step are you today?  Lokshin and
Ravallion (1999) show that total household income is a significant predictor of the
answer to the subjective welfare question, although its explanatory power is low.  In the
Polish data, living standards are measured by the question: How would you rate the
general material si uation of your household?  Very good, good, average, rather bad or
bad.  These answers are converted into a 5 point linear scale.  By definition, this
instrument should be related to underlying living standards.  It seems unlikely that it is
correlated with measurement error in equivalent consumption.
The second instrument is equivalent household income.  While this instrument is
related to underlying living standards, one may worry whether measurement error in
equivalent income is independent of measurement error in equivalent consumption.  For
example, a misspecified equivalence scale would cause a correlation between these error
terms.  Similarly, households who willingly underreport income (e.g. due to forgetfulness
or for fear of taxation), might also underreport consumption.  Hence, this second
instrument is chosen by lack of a better alternative.
Fortunately, it is possible to deduce how a correlation between measurement error
in income and consumption would affect the results.  Such a correlation would lead to an
upward bias in acy (and the analogous expression for first differences).  This would lead
us to overestimate the fraction of the variance that can be explained by movements in
underlying living standards and to underestimate the part due to measurement error.
14Hence,  all the estimates  for fractions  of measurement  error should  probably  be treated as
lower bounds.
Table 2 presents the IV estimates  of the fraction  of the variance  that is due to
measurement  error. These results  will be discussed  in more  detail in the subsequent
sections. Nevertheless,  the table already shows that measurement  error is responsible  for
a large fraction, typically  30%-60%,  of cross-sectional  variance. Measurement  error
accounts  for an even larger share, generally  around 55%-80%,  of the variance  of income
and expenditure  shocks. Measurement  error seems to be about as important  for
consumption  as for income and is generally  higher in Russia than in Poland. 6
Table 2: Instrumental  Variable  Estimates  of the Fraction  Measurement  Error
Russia 1994-1998  Poland 1993-1996
Fraction measurement  error in:  Consumption  Income  Consumption  Income
Logs, Period 1  0.447  (0.073)  0.564  (0.064)  0.346  (0.023)  0.402(0.035)
Logs,  Period 2  0.531  (0.055)  0.676  (0.055)  0.386  (0.024)  0.363(0.036)
Logs, Period 3  0.517  (0.049)  0.561  (0.057)  0.401  (0.022)  0.332(0.039)
Logs,Period4  0.320  (0.056)  0.618  (0.043)  0.381  (0.021)  0.285(0.033)
Log difference,  period 2-1  0.751  (0.098)  0.797  (0.094)  0.682  (0.051)  0.534(0.084)
Log difference,  period 3-2  0.746  (0.413)  0.869  (0.181)  0.710  (0.039)  0.546(0.073)
Log difference,  period 4-3  0.779  (0.111)  0.699  (0.190)  0.728  (0.046)  0.42(0.94)
Note: All measures  are for equivalent  adults. The equivalence  scale is household  size to the power of 0.75 (e=0.75). Data consist of
balanced panels, 1993-1996  for Poland and 1994-1998  for Russia.
4.  Underlying  Inequality
It is common  to measure  inequality  in living standards  by inequality  in income or
expenditure  across individuals  in a given  month. However,  income or expenditure  in a
given month  is only an imprecise  measure  of the living standard  of a household. Inco:me
or expenditure  could be misreported  or could  reflect transitory  events. Whenever
measured  income (or expenditure)  is an imperfect  indicator  of true living standards,  the
inequality  in measured  incomes  or expenditures  will exceed  the inequality  in underlyi:ng
6 We find the same  pattern of measurement  in food expenditure,  though  measurement  error in food
expenditure  tends to be higher  than that in total expenditure. See appendix  table Al for details.
15living standards.
The first way of reducing the role of transitory events and measurement error is to
examine inequality in average incomes (Shorrocks, 1978). For each family, we calculate
4 measures of their living standards:  (i) their income in the current month, (ii) the
average of their incomes in the current month and 12 months ago, (iii) the average of
their incomes in the current month, 12 months ago, and 24 months ago, and (iv) the
average of their incomes in the current month, 12, 24 and 36 months ago.  More
idiosyncratic components of income and measurement error will be averaged out as we
average over more periods, but method also averages out some true mobility -
movements in the underlying level of material well-being.  Nevertheless, the inequality of
average income over four periods is likely to be a better approximation of underlying
inequality than the one based on income in a single month.  Figure 1 shows how
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, declines as we average income or
expenditure over more periods.  In Russia the Gini drops by about 20% to 25% when
income or expenditure is averaged over 4 periods.  The relative drop in Poland is smaller,
Figure 1: Gini Drops when Income or Expenditure is Averaged over Time
r  Russia  Russia  Poland  Poland
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Note:  All measures  are for equivalent adults  where the equivalent  scale equals household  size to the power of 0.75. Ginis are
calculated  such  that the difference between  I period Ginis and multi-period Ginis is solely due to the  averaging and not due to any
changes  in inequality  during the years  for which the Ginis arc calculated.  Data consist of balanced panels,  1993-1996 for Poland and
1994-1998 for Russia.  Standard errors on the Ginis are less than 0.010 and standard  errors on the  differences  in Ginis are less than
0.005.
16about 15%. Hence,  the difference  between  inequality  in Russia  and Poland becomes
smaller  when we average incomes  or expenditure  over 4 periods rather than looking  at a
single  period. Whether the Gini in Russia drops  more because  Russians  are more mobile
or because  incomes  and expenditures  are measured  with more noise is explored  below.
The OECD  (1997) examined  by how much the Gini of earnings  inequality
dropped  in 6 OECD countries  when  weekly or monthly  earnings  of full-time  workers are
averaged  over a 4 year period. 7 While earnings  of full-time  workers  are not strictly
comparable  to equivalent  income or expenditure,  it is nevertheless  remarkable  that in
these OECD countries  the Gini coefficient  only dropped  by 3 to 5 percent. Rutkowski
(1999)  performed  a similar calculation  for Hungary  and found that the Gini dropped  by
8.2% when monthly  earnings  are averaged  over a 5 year  period. In contrast,  Galasi
(1998) finds the Gini of annual  per capita household  income in Hungary  dropped  by
11.7%  when incomes  are averaged  over a 5 year period. 8 This suggests  that the relatively
low reductions  in the Ginis in the calculations  using earnings  may in part be related  to the
focus on a sample  of continuously  employed  full-time  workers. Gibson,  Huang and
Rozelle (1999) calculated  Gini coefficients  for a sample  of 232 Chinese  urban households
using both monthly  and annual household  expenditure. They find the Gini based on
monthly expenditure  is about 50%  to 80%  higher  than the one based on annual
expenditure,  indicating  that monthly expenditures  are subject  to many shocks  that get
averaged  out over the year.
The second approach  removes any transitory  component  (including  measurement
error) in income using the methodology  described  formally  in the previous section. T  he
main assumption  of this methodology  is that the income or expenditure  distribution  can
be approximated  well by a log normal distribution. The intuition,  however, can be
explained  easily with the fashion  metaphor. We measure  the variety in each person's
wardrobe by examining  how much  the quality of this person's clothes  vary from day to
day. When this day-to-day  variation  is higher,  the quality of the outfit worn on any
particular  day more likely reflects an idiosyncratic  choice rather  than the underlying
7The  countries  examined  are Denmark,  France, Germany,  Italy, the United Kingdom  and the United
States, and the data covers  the period 1986-1989.
17quality of that person's wardrobe. Once we have  measured  how much variety there is (on
average) in each person's wardrobe,  we assume that everybody  has exactly  the same
wardrobe and predict how much inequality  we would find solely due to idiosyncratic
choices. To the extent that measured  inequality  is greater than this predicted  amount  of
inequality,  it must be the case that not everybody's  wardrobe  is equal. Moreover,  one can
calculate  the amount of inequality  that must exist in the quality of wardrobes.
Figure 2: Measured versus Underlying Gini Coefficients
Russia  Russia  Poland  Poland
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Note: Data refer to 1995  for :ussia and 1994  for Poland. Measured  Ginis include transitory  variation including  possible  measurement  error
while underlying  Ginis are purged of any transitory  variation. Standard  errors  on the measured  and underlying  Ginis are  0.02 or less for Russia
and 0.01 or less for Poland. Differences  between  measured  and underlying  Ginis are highly statistically significant  in all cases.
We apply  this methodology  to the income and expenditure  distribution  in Russia
and Poland. For the purpose of living standards,  we define any component  of income or
expenditure  that is expected  to disappear  within 12  months as transitory. These transitory
components  are the economic  equivalent  of the idiosyncratic  choice of what to wear on
any given day. The underlying  component  is the component  of income or expenditure
that is expected  to last at least 12 months (perhaps  longer,  but this cannot  be inferred
from the data). One can interpret  this component  as the income or expenditure  that you
Our own calculations,  using the Tarki  Panel for 1994-1997,  yielded a 11.3%  drop in Hungary's Gini for
income per equivalent  adult when income  was averaged  over 4 years. The equivalence  scale equals
household  size raised to the power of 0.75.
18can expect to get in 12  months from now. This is equivalent  to the quality of one's
wardrobe,  because the expected  quality of an outfit randomly  chosen from your wardrobe
is equal  to the average quality  of outfits  in your wardrobe. Figure 2 shows  measured  and
underlying  income and expenditure  inequality  in Russia  and Poland.
In Russia  underlying  income inequality  is about 30% lower than income
inequality  in a given  month. This means  that much  of the income inequality  in a given
month is due to transitory  events  and measurement  error that increase or decrease a
family's income for that month. In Russia,  underlying  expenditure  inequality  is aboult
20% lower than expenditure  inequality  in a given  month. In Poland, the differences
between  underlying and monthly inequality  are somewhat  smaller  - about  20% for
income inequality  and about 15% for expenditure  inequality. Because  the role of
transitory events  and measurement  error is larger  in Russia  than in Poland,  the differences
in inequality  between  Russia and Poland  become smaller  when we consider  underlying
inequality  rather than measured  inequality.
Finally,  we try to remove  measurement  error from income and expenditure  by
instrumenting  them. Instrumenting  differs from the previous  method in two ways. First,
instrumenting  does not remove transitory  shocks  to living conditions. Second,  while the
previous method only removed  transitory  measurement  error, instrumenting  will remove
measurement  error whether it is transitory  or not. The methodology  of instrumenting  is
described  in detail in the previous section,  but two important  assumptions  need to be
emphasized. First, the methodology  assumes  lognormality  of the expenditure  and income
distribution. Second,  it assumes  that measurement  error in income, expenditure  and
subjective  living conditions  are uncorrelated. To the extent that measurement  error in
expenditure  and income are correlated,  it will bias the instrumented  Gini upwards.
As figure 3 shows,  instrumenting  indicates  that measurement  error contributes
substantially  to the Gini coefficients,  especially  in Russia. After instrumenting,  the Ginis
for Russia and Poland  become quite similar - around 0.25. Taken at face value, this
result implies  that the difference  in the measured inequality  between  Russia and Poland is
purely  driven  by differences  in the data quality between  those countries.
However,  the instrumenting  relies on a number  of seemingly  reasonable  but
untestable  assumptions,  most notably  that the errors  in the instruments  are uncorrelated
19with each other.  Hence, this result should probably be taken as an indication that
differences in data quality are  largely, but probably not entirely, responsible for all of
difference in inequality between Russia and Poland.
Figure  3.  Instrumenting  Ginis to Eliminate  Measurement  Error
Russia  Russia  Poland  Poland
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Note:  Data  refer  to 1995  for Russia  and 1994  for  Poland.  Measured  Ginis  include  possible  measurement  error. Ginis  are
instrumented  in  order  to eliminate  measurement  error.  Instruments  for  log income  are  a measure  of subjective  living  conditions  and
log  expenditure.  Instruments  for  log expenditure  are  a measure  of subjective  living  conditions  and  log  income.  The  calculations
assume  log  normal  income  and  expenditure  distributions  and  assume  that  measurement  error  in income,  expenditure  and  subjective
living  conditions  are  independent.  To  the  extend  measurement  error  is  correlated,  the  instrumented  Ginis  are  biased  upwards.
Standard  errors  are  less than  0.02  for  both  measured  and  instrumented  Ginis.  Differences  between  measured  and  instrumented  Ginis
are  highly  statistically  significant  in  all  cases.
5.  Economic Security
Following families over time also allows us to examine the stability, or security,
of their economic situation.  Figure 4 shows for Russia and for Poland the distribution of
income and expenditure  shocks, measured as percentage changes between the reference
month and the same month one year later.9 These percentage changes are reported in
deviation of the national mean.  The figure shows that families experience huge
9 The reference  month is the month  in which the household  was observed  in wave 2 of the survey. In
Russia, wave 2 was fielded in November  and December of 1995 while in Poland wave 2 was fielded
between January and December of 1994.
20fluctuations in their incomes, as reported in the household surveys.  For example, over
Figure 4: Distribution of Shocks
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Note:  The  figure  shows  the distribution  of the  change  in real  equivalent  income  and  real  equivalent  expenditure  between  the  referunec  month
and  the  same  month  one  year  later. The  reference  month  is the  month  in  which  the  household  was  observed  in  wave  2 of the  survey.  In
Russia, wave 2 was fielded in November  and December  of 1995  while  in Poland wave  2 was fielded between  January and December  of 1994.
Income and expenditure  shocks  are in deviation  of the  national mean.  The mean income shock  was -4.0% in Russia and 1.8%  in Ploland  while
the mean expenditure  shock  was -8.3% in Russia  and 4.  1% in Poland. Since categories  have different sizes, these plots do not show
distribution  functions.
40% of the population in Russia either sees their income increase to more than double, or
fall to less than half, while in Poland this fluctuation happens to slightly more than  10%
of the population.  Fluctuations in reported expenditures are only slightly smaller than
those in incomes.
At first blush, these fluctuations in economic fortunes appear to be huge, but
many of these changes might reflect transitory events that have a relatively small effect
on underlying well-being of the population.  In terms of our fashion metaphor, suppose
we observe an individual who usually wears cheap clothes but who today wears
expensive ones.  This could be a persistent change that affects her underlying fashion
21quality - she got rid of her old cheap wardrobe  and bought all new expensive  clothes. Or
it could  reflect a transitory  effect - the wardrobe  stayed  the same,  and she merely
happened  to wear today  her only expensive  item. Moreover,  many of the fluctuations
might not reflect  real events  but simply  measurement  error in the data. Below, we
investigate  the role of transitory  shocks  and measurement  error more thoroughly.
Suppose  we observe someone  whose  income was steady  until last year, but who
experiences  a change  in this year's income (as compared  to last year). The persistent
component  of the change is the fraction  of the change  that will last at least until next year,
while the remainder  is transitory. We estimate  that 90% of the variance  of income shocks
is transitory  while 82% is transitory  in Poland. The figures for expenditure  shocks are
86% and 76%. This means that shocks  are largely  transitory,  i.e. their effect will be
largely undone within a year. For example,  a Russian  family  who used to be earning
2000 Rubles per month  and whose income increased  to 3000 Rubles in the current
month, should  expect their income to fall back to 2  1  00 Rubles in the same  month one
year from now. In other words, only 10%  of the positive income shock of 1000  Rubles
will persist for at least a year  while the remaining  90% will disappear  before that.
Using  the instrumental  variable  approach  to find out what fraction  of the variance
of the shocks  is caused  by measurement  error, we find that in Poland about 55% of the
variance  of income shocks  and 70% of the variance  of expenditure  shocks can be traced
to measurement  error. For Russia, we estimate  that about  80% of the shocks  is due to
measurement  error, but this estimate  is very imprecise.
Since our estimates  indicate  that a substantial  fraction  of the shocks are transitory
or are due to measurement  error, Figure 5 shows  the size of shocks  with and without  the
transitory  component  and measurement  error. We measure  the size of shocks  by the
median absolute  deviation. In other  words, we first calculate  the absolute size of the
shock (in percentage  terms),  and then find the median. Figure 5 shows that if we take the
data at face value, the median Russian  faced an income shock of about 57% (up or
down). However,  if we only consider  the permanent  component,  the median absolute
shock drops to about 19%,  while if we remove measurement  error, it drops to about  21%.
The pattern for expenditure  shocks  in Russia is similar. Measured  income and
expenditure  shocks  are smaller in Poland, but there too, removing  the transitory
22component  or measurement  error leads  to substantial  drops. Hence,  the figure indicates
that in both Russia and in Poland, the living standards  are more stable  than the measured
data would indicate. Nevertheless,  even after correcting  for measurement  error or
transitory  shocks,  individuals  in Poland and especially  in Russia face considerable
fluctuations  in living standards.
Table A2 in the appendix  shows the size of expenditure  shocks  as well as their
breakdown  in transitory  and permanent  components  for different  demographic  groups in
Poland. Table A3 shows the same  information  for Russia. The  tables show that for most
demographic  groups,  neither the size nor the composition  of the shocks  is significantly
different  from the overall mean. However,  there are a few notable exceptions. Both in
Russia and in Poland, individuals  with access  to land face larger shocks  that tend to be
less permanent,  but these differences  are only statistically  significant  in Poland. In
Poland, the size of the shock  (as a fraction of expenditure)  increases  with income, while it
displays a U-shaped pattern in Russia. In both countries,  households  with household
heads aged 51-64 with higher  education  face the smallest  shocks,  but this difference  is
only significant  in Poland.
Figure 5: Median absolute  shocks after  correction  for
transitory  component  and measurement  error.
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Note: Shocks  are measured  as log changes  (times 100)  and are in deviation  of the national  mean. The standard error on the
measured  median absolute  shock  is less than 2 percentage  points in all cases. The standard errors  on the median absolute  shock
without the transitory  component  are about 10 for income  and expenditure  shocks  in Russia and about 5 for shocks  in Poland. The
standard errors  of the median absolute  shock  without measurement  error are about  30 and 5 respectively.
236.  Mobility and Underlying Poverty
In face of the sizeable income and expenditure shocks, one might wonder how
long-lasting economic positions are.  Do the rich generally remain rich and the poor
remain poor, or do individuals frequently switch positions?  The degree to which
individuals keep their position in the income distribution can be measured by the
correlation between this period's  income and the next period's.  Table 3 shows these
correlations for income and expenditures in Russia and Poland.
Table 3.  Correlations in Income and Expenditure
Russia  Poland
Income  Expenditure  Income  Expenditure
A. Traditional  correlations
Current  month and 12 months  later  0.335  0.479  0.535  0.627
Current  month and 24 months  later  0.254  0.431  0.549  0.626
Current  month and 36 months  later  ..  ..  0.457  0.569
Current  month and 48 months later  0.266  0.380
B. Underlying  correlations
Correlation  between underlying  0.884  0.924  0.934  0.937
income/expenditure  in current
month and 12 months later
Memo:  "traditional" correlation  0.338  0.510  0.575  0.678
over the same  time period.
Notes: Equivalent  income and equivalent  expenditure  are  measured  in logarithmic  form. In panel A, the current month is taken from
the  first of the 4 waves  of the data. The first wave of the Russian  data was collected  in November/December  of 1994 and the first
wave  of the  Polish data was collected  between  January  and December  of 1993. Correlations  between  persistent  income/expenditure
can only be calculated for waves 2 and 3 of the data. In both countries,  wave 2 was collected  1 year after the first wave,  and wave 3
was collected  2 years  after the first wave. Standard  error for these correlations  are generally  around 0.02 to 0.03.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the correlation between current log income or log
expenditure, and its value in future periods.  The correlation between a family's  current
economic situation and that 12 months from now is slightly less than 50% in Russia and
somewhat more than 50% in Poland.  This would suggest a lot of churning.  However,
these correlations fall only very little if we move out one, two or three extra years.  Does
this mean that the churning has largely ceased after the first year?  The explanation for
this pattern of correlations is that the correlation between any two years is less than unity
for two reasons:  (i) the transitory shocks that occur in each of the two years, and (ii) the
underlying amount of churning - the persistent shocks between the two years.  Whether
24we compare the correlation between incomes that lie one, two or three years apart, the
amount by which the correlation is reduced below unity due to transitory shocks is about
the same.  Hence, the amount by which these correlations fall as we compare incomes
that lie one year apart to incomes that lie 2 years apart provides a measure of the amount
of underlying churning that takes place.  This idea can be formalized to calculate the
correlation between the underlying incomes in two adjacent years.  As panel B of Table 3
shows, this correlation ranges from 88% for incomes in Russia to 94% percent for
expenditure in Poland, suggesting that there is relatively little switching of underlying
economic fortunes.  Mobility in expenditure shows, by and large, the same picture.
Perhaps the fashion metaphor can further illustrate the mobility pattern.  The
traditional correlations measure to what extent people who wear nice clothes today also
wear nice clothes on a given day one year from now.  Here we see relatively low
correlations because one day people may wear a nice outfit from their wardrobe while the
next year they might wear some old clothes from the same wardrobe.  While the
traditional correlations measure people's positions on the fashion hierarchy by the clothes
they wear on a given day, the persistent correlations measure their fashion position by the
average quality of their wardrobe.  Hence, high persistent correlations indicate that
people who had a nice wardrobe one year ago, still, by and large, have nice wardrobes
this year.  By this measure, few people switch ranks on the fashion hierarchy.
An especially important form of mobility is the extent to which the poor can
escape poverty.  To facilitate comparisons of mobility in and out of poverty in Russia and
Poland, we chose a poverty line such that in each year 20% of the population in each
country is considered poor.  We present results for poverty based on equivalent
household expenditures, but the findings for income based poverty are qualitatively the
same.  We can classify someone as poor based on their measured expenditure in a given
month ("traditionally measured" poverty) or based on the underlying component of their
expenditure in that month ("underlying" poverty).  This is analogous to determining
someone's  fashion deprivation by the clothes he wears that day or by the clothes in his
wardrobe.  Table 4 shows the flows into and out of poverty for measured and underlying
poverty for Russia and Poland.
25Table 4.  Flows Into and Out of Poverty
A.  Movements  in "Traditionally  Measured"  Poverty
Russia (95-96)  Poland (94-95)
Poverty status 12  Poverty status
months ago  This month's poverty status  12 months  ago  This month's poverty status
Poor  Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor
Poor  44.7%  55.3%  Poor  55.3%  44.7%
Non-poor  13.8%  86.2%  Non-poor  11.2%  88.8%
B. Movements  in "Underlying"  Poverty
Russia (95-96)  Poland (94-95)
Poverty status 12  Poverty  status
months ago  This month's poverty  status  12  months ago  This month's poverty status
Poor  Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor
Poor  79.4%  20.6%  Poor  80.2%  19.8%
Non-poor  5.2%  94.8%  Non-poor  4.9%  95.1%
Note: Underlying  poverty  measures are  based on simulations  assumning  log normality  of expenditure  distributions. Poverty  is
measured  by equivalent expenditure  where the equivalence  scale is household  size raised to the power of 0.75. The poverty line is
such that the poverty rate is 20% in all years. Measured  poor are those  whose equivalent expenditure  in the current year falls  below
the poverty line. Underlying  poor are those  whose equivalent  expenditure  purged of transitory  shocks  falls  below the poverty line.
Standard errors  are never larger  than one fifth of the transition  probabilities.
Panel A of Table 4 shows movements in and out of poverty as measured by
expenditures in the current month while panel B shows movements based on individuals'
underlying poverty status.  Both panels show that mobility in and out of poverty is
markedly higher in Russia than in Poland.  The contrast between traditionally measured
poverty flows and underlying poverty flows is even stronger.  According to the traditional
measure, 55.3% of the Russian poor can expect to escape poverty by the next year, while
only 20.6% of those in underlying poverty can expect to escape poverty.  In Poland, these
figures are 44.7% and 19.8% respectively.  Hence, a large fraction of the movements in
and out of poverty are not related to persistent changes in economic fortunes, but merely
reflect one-time transitional shocks affecting either expenditure this month or expenditure
12 months ago.  When poverty is defined by the lowest quintile in the per capita income
distribution, Galasi (1998) finds that in Hungary 40.5% of the poor in 1994 (according to
the traditional measure) can expect to escape poverty by the next year, which is similar to
the figure found for Poland.
In Poland, for example, 44% of those who escape poverty according to the
traditional measure, are individuals whose persistent expenditure remained above the
26poverty  line, but who experienced  a transitional  negative  shock in the previous period.  10
They are like people who have a perfectly  nice wardrobe  at home,  but just happened to
wear old clothes yesterday. Similarly,  33% of those who escape  poverty according  to the
traditional  measure  are individuals  whose  persistent  expenditure  remained  below the
poverty  line, but who experience  a transitional  positive shock  in the current  month. The
fact that their persistent  expenditure  lies below the poverty  line means  that they would
expect to be poor again in the following  period. They  are like people who  have very old
clothes in their wardrobe,  but happened  to wear their only presentable  item today. Only
18%  of those who escape  poverty according  to the traditional  measure also saw  their
underlying  poverty status rise above  the poverty  line."  l
These findings also hold up if we examine  extreme  poverty,  defined as the poorest
10%,  rather than poverty defined  as the lowest 20%. According  to the traditional
measure,  66.8% of extremely  poor Russians  escape  extreme  poverty  within 12 months.
However,  only 28.9 of those who are poor according  to their underlying  consumption
level escape extreme  poverty  within  a year. For Poland,  these figures are 53.7% and
24.5%. Hence,  while many of those in extreme  poverty  may seem  to escape extreme
poverty,  many of these escapes  reflect  measurement  error or transitory  shocks. Less than
a third of the extreme  poor will find their underlying  consumption  level rise above  the
poverty  line within  a year.
7. Underclass
Has an underclass  of people living for prolonged  periods in poverty emerged? A
common way of addressing  this question  is by finding  the fraction  of the population that
is poor in all periods of the survey. Panel  A of Table 5 shows these fractions  for income
and expenditure  poverty  in Russia  and Poland. As the table shows, around  3% of the
population  is poor in all 4 periods in Russia while  the comparable  figure lies around 5.5%
in Poland. Based on these figures,  the underclass  seems small in both countries. Galasi
'° The 4x4 joint probability  distributions  of underlying  and measured  poverty  in the current period (4
possibilities),  and underlying  and measured  poverty 12 months ago (4 possibilities)  are presented in Table
A4 in the appendix. The probabilities  reported in the text are derived from this table.
H  The remaining  5% consist  of those whose  underlying  poverty  status fell below the poverty  line but whose
traditionally  measured  status rose above it
27(1998) finds that 6.5% of Hungarians have per capita incomes in the lowest quintile in all
5 years, indicating that persistent poverty in Hungary may be slightly higher than in
Poland.
Table 5. Poverty and Underclass
Russia  Poland
Income  Expenditure  Income  Expenditure
A. Fractions  based on measured  poverty
"Always"  poor (4 out of 4)  2.2%  3.4%  5.3%  5.9%
"Sometimes"  poor(1, 2or3  times out of 4)  45.4%  41.9%  33.5%  31.6%
"Never" poor (0 times out of 4)  52.4%  54.7%  61.2%  62.5%
B. Fraction based on simulation  using
underlying  poverty transition  probabilities
"Always"  poor (4 out of 4)  7.4%  10.0%  9.9%  10.3%
"Sometimes"  poor (1, 2 or 3 times  out of 4)  28.2%  21.8%  22.0%  21.0%
"Never" poor (0 times out of 4)  64.3%  68.2%  68.1%  68.7%
C. Memo Items
Probability  of remaining  in underlying  poverty  0.720  0.794  0.791  0.802
Probability  of remaining  out of underlying  poverty  0.930  0.948  0.948  0.951
Mean absolute  deviation  of transitory shock  (in %)  54.3%  45.3%  20.9%  19.2%
Notes: Income  and expenditure  are adjusted  for household  size using an equivalence  scale that equals household  size raised to the
power of 0.75. The poverty line is set such  that in each year  20 percent of  the population  is poor.
Care needs to be taken, however, in interpreting such figures (see Jalan and
Ravallion, 1998, and Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000).  First, by construction, the underclass
will shrink as the number of periods in the dataset increases.  Second, this measure of
underclass is very sensitive to transitory shocks and measurement error.  A person whose
underlying measure of well-being is consistently below the poverty line may occasionally
appear as non-poor due to a transitory shock or measurement error.  Hence, in countries
with more transitory shocks and measurement error, the size of the underclass, as
traditionally measured, will appear to be smaller than it really is.  To illustrate this point,
we simulate the fraction of the population whose underlying consumption or income
measure is below the poverty line in all four periods using the transition probabilities  of
underlying poverty.  These results are shown in panel B of Table 5. According to this
simulation, the underclass in Russia is 7% to 10% of the population or about 3 times the
size of the underclass based on measured poverty.  The simulation shows that about 10%
28of the Polish population is in underlying poverty in all 4 periods.  It is especially
instructive to compare the size of the underclass based on expenditure in Russia to the
one based in income in Poland (columns 2 and 3).  According to traditionally measured
poverty, the underclass is much smaller in Russia (3.4%) than in Poland (5.3%), while
according to underlying poverty, the sizes are almost identical (10.0% in Russia and 9.9%
in Poland).  This difference is explained by the difference in the size of the transitory
shocks, which averages 45.3% for expenditure in Russia but only 20.9% for income in
Poland.
Since the size of the underclass as defined by living in poverty for 4 consecutive
years is sensitive to transitory shocks and measurement error, we define the underclass as
those whose average expenditure over 4 years falls below a given threshold.  This
corresponds to Jalan and Ravallion's  (1998) definition of the Chronic poor.  Tables 6 and
7 show the poverty rates by demographic characteristics for three types of poverty:  (i) a
"traditional poverty" measure - the lowest quintile of equivalent expenditures in the base
period; (ii) the "broad underclass" - the lowest quintile of average equivalent
expenditures over 4 years; and (iii) the "severe underclass" - the lowest decile of average
equivalent expenditure over 4 years.  Table 6 shows the comparison for Poland.  It shows
that for most demographic subgroups, the probability of traditional poverty is not
significantly different  from the probability of belonging to the broad underclass (see the
t-statistics in column 7).  When there is a significant difference, the probability of
belonging to the broad underclass is higher than the probability of traditional poverty if
and only if the probability of traditional poverty for that group was higher than average.
In other words, differences in poverty rates across subgroups become somewhat more,
pronounced.  Comparing the extreme underclass to the broad underclass, we find
differences in poverty rates again become more pronounced.  Demographic groups who
are overrepresented in the broad underclass are even more overrepresented in the extreme
underclass (see t-statistics in column  11). The pattern for Russia, reported in Table 7, is
similar except that fewer differences are statistically significant.  Hence, it seems that a
poverty profile based on cross-sectional data can serve as a reasonable  guide to a poverty
profile of chronically poor: generally speaking, demographic subgroups that are
29overrepresented  among  the poor as measured  in a cross-section  are likely to be even more
strongly overrepresented  among  the Chronic  poor.
8. Conclusion
This paper tried to distinguish  underlying  inequality  and mobility  in two transition
countries  for inequality  and mobility  driven  by transitory  shocks  or measurement  error.
This approach  yielded three main findings: First, accounting  for noise in the data
substantially  reduces  inequality  measures. Since  this reduction  is most pronounced  in
Russia, underlying  inequality  in these  two countries  is more similar  than the uncorrected
inequality  measures  would suggest. Second, individuals  in both countries  face much
economic  insecurity  - the median absolute  annual change  in income  or expenditure  is
around 50% in Russia and around 20% in Poland. However,  around half of these
fluctuations  reflect measurement  error or transitory  shocks. Hence,  underlying  income or
expenditure  levels are much more stable. Third, the apparent  high levels of economic
mobility are largely driven  by transitory  events and noisy data. After accounting  for
transitory  shocks, around 80% of the poor in Russia  and Poland remain in poverty for at
least one year. Hence,  there is a real risk that an entrenched  underclass  emerges in these
transition economies.
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32Table 6. Poverty and Underclass in Poland
Traditional  poverty  Broad underclass  Severe underclass
(20 % poorest  based on  (20 % poorest based  on average  (10 % poorest based on average
expenditure  in 1994)  expenditure  in 1993-96)  expenditre  in 1993-96)
Poverty  t-stat.  Poverty  t-stat.  t-stat.  Poverty  t-stat.  t-stat.
Rate  SE  (1)  Rate  SE  (4)  (4)-(1)  Rate  SE  (8)  (
8)-(4)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)
Whole  sample  0.200  0.001  n/a  0.200  0.001  n/a  n/a  0.100  0.001  n/a  n/a
Age Groups
0-15  0.287  0.006  13.7  0.293  0.006  15.0  1.2  0.160  0.004  15.2  4.7
16-30  0.206  0.007  0.8  0.204  0.007  0.7  -0.2  0.094  0.005  -1.0  -2.0
31-50  0.191  0.004  -2.3  0.191  0.005  -2.0  0.0  0.099  0.003  -0.4  1.5
51-64  0.101  0.008  -12.7  0.090  0.007  -15.7  -1.8  0.034  0.004  -16.0  -3.4
65+  0.133  0.011  -6.1  0.129  0.011  -6.7  -0.5  0.047  0.007  -7.3  -3.4
Access to land
No  0.176  0.007  -3.5  0.175  0.007  -3.6  -0.2  0.088  0.006  -2.0  0.2
Yes  0.215  0.004  3.5  0.215  0.004  3.7  -0.1  0.107  0.003  2.0  -0.2
Own Automobile
No  0.265  0.006  11.0  0.273  0.006  11.6  1.8  0.145  0.004  10.6  2.9
Yes  0.121  0.007  -11.5  0.110  0.007  -12.1  -2.1  0.044  0.005  -11.4  -2.9
Household  typologv
Single  parent  with child(ren)  0.302  0.041  2.4  0.290  0.042  2.2  -0.3  0.138  0.029  1.3  -0.3
Other  family  withlchild(ren)  0.258  0.007  8.6  0.270  0.007  10.0  2.0  0.147  0.005  8.8  '.8
Single  elderly  male  0.102  0.063  -1.6  0.088  0.073  -1.5  -0.2  0.081  0.067  -0.3  1.0
Singleelderly  female  0.133  0.032  -2.1  0.098  0.026  -4.0  -1.2  0.022  0.013  -5.9  -2.1
Multipleelderly  0.101  0.029  -3.4  0.114  0.031  -2.7  0.6  0.040  0.018  -3.3  -1.3
Otherfamilywithoutlchildren  0.139  0.007  -9.0  0.126  0.007  -10.5  -2.1  0.052  0.005  -9.2  -2.6
Number of Children  under 15
Zero  0.097  0.007  -14.3  0.085  0.007  -17.1  -2.1  0.032  0.004  -17.1  -3.2
One  0.167  0.011  -3.0  0.172  0.014  -2.1  0.5  0.068  0.008  -3.9  -2.9
Two  0.231  0.013  2.4  0.238  0.013  2.9  0.6  0.118  0.009  2.0  0.1
Threeormore  0.419  0.019  11.5  0.424  0.019  11.8  0.3  0.258  0.015  10.6  4.5
Number of income  earners
Zero  0.207  0.006  1.0  0.199  0.006  0.0  -1.3  0.102  0.005  0.4  0.5
One  0.248  0.011  4.S  0.263  0.012  5.5  1.5  0.138  0.009  4.3  0.9
Two  0.118  0.012  -6.8  0.113  0.012  -7.0  -0.5  0.042  0.008  -7.2  -2.3
Three  or more  0.150  0.042  -1.2  0.152  0.044  -1.1  0.1  0.073  0.029  -0.9  -0.1
Gender of household  head
Male  0.196  0.004  -0.9  0.195  0.004  -1.1  -0.4  0.099  0.003  0.0  0.9
Female  0.211  0.012  0.9  0.212  0.011  1.1  0.1  0.100  0.009  0.0  -0.9
Labor market status of household  head
Employed  0.199  0.004  -0.4  0.198  0.004  -0.3  -0.2  0.098  0.003  -0.7  -0,6
Unemployed  0.609  0.045  9.1  0.546  0.047  7.4  -1.5  0.344  0.046  5.3  2.0
Retired  0.154  0.012  -4.0  0.162  0.011  -3.3  1.0  0.075  0.009  -2.7  -1.0
Other  0.578  0.100  3.8  0.470  0.104  2.6  -1.0  0.368  0.098  2.7  1.8
Age & education of houwehold  head
16-30  Primary  0.405  0.088  2.3  0.326  0.072  1.8  -1.0  0.142  0.060  0.7  -0.4
16-30  Basic Vocational  0.296  0.029  3.4  0.291  0.029  3.2  -0.2  0.138  0.024  1.6  -0.4
16-30 Secondary  0.122  0.037  -2.1  0.127  0.032  -2.3  0.1  0.025  0.014  -5.4  -2.5
16-30  Higher  0.103  0.065  -1.5  0.058  0.057  -2.5  -1.0  0.000  0.000  nla  n'a
31-50  Primary  0.370  0.024  7.2  0.389  0.022  8.7  1.0  0.232  0.019  6.8  2.9
31-50Basic  Vocational  0.258  0.012  4.8  0.260  0.011  5.5  0.2  0.135  0.009  3.8  0.9
31-50  Secondary  0.136  0.013  -4.8  0.134  0.012  -5.4  -0.2  0.068  0.009  -3.4  0.2
31-50  Higher  0.048  0.015  -10.2  0.032  0.010  -16.8  -1.1  0.007  0.006  -15.2  -1.4
51-64  Primary  0.155  0.017  -2.7  0.159  0.018  -2.3  0.3  0.056  0.012  -3.7  -2.2
51-64  Basic Vocational  0.109  0.030  -3.0  0.097  0.028  -3.7  -0.7  0.048  0.022  -2.3  0.0
51-64  Secondary  0.050  0.016  -9.6  0.054  0.017  -8.5  0.2  0.010  0.006  -14.6  -2.0
51-64Higher  0.018  0.015  -11.9  0.020  0.014  -12.7  0.3  0.014  0.013  -6.3  0.5
65+ Primary  0.195  0.025  -0.2  0.191  0.026  -0.3  -0.2  0.074  0.018  -1.5  -1.6
65+ Morethanprimary  0.058  0.020  -7.0  0.033  0.013  -12.4  -1.6  0.021  0.013  -6.1  0.5
Subjective  living condition
Very  bad  0.500  0.030  10.1  0.504  0.030  10.2  0.2  0.347  0.028  8.7  4.3
Bad  0.300  0.010  9.9  0.299  0.011  8.8  -0.1  0.150  0.009  5.4  0.1
Average  0.127  0.006  -11.4  0.124  0.006  -12.1  -0.5  0.050  0.004  -11A4  -3.3
Good orvery  good  0.046  0.012  -13.1  0.055  0.012  -12.2  1.0  0.014  0.006  -13.3  -2.2
Quintile  in average expenditure  ('93- 96)
Bottom  0.740  0.015  35.8  1.000  n/a  r/a  a/a  0.500  n/a  n/a  n/a
Second  0.181  0.016  -1.2  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a
Third  0.062  0.010  -13.4  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  n/a  naa  n/a
Fourth  0.019  0.005  -35.5  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  n/a  n/a  n a
Top  0.006  0.003  -75.5  0.000  n/a  n/a  _na  0.000  n/a  n/a  ala
Notes: Demographic  characteristics  are measured  in the base period,  which is 1994  for Poland.  Expenditure  is adjusted  for farnily
size using the baseline equivalence  scale.  The t-statistics  in columns  (3), (6) and (10) show whether  the  poverty rate for the
demographic  group  is significantly  different from the national  average. The t-statistic  in column (7) tests the difference  between
columns (4) and (1) while  the t-statistic in column (11) tests the difference  between  columns (8) and (4).
33Table 7. Poverty and Underclass in Russia
Traditional  poverty  Broad underclass  Severe underclass
(20 % poorest based on  (20 % poorest  based on average  (10 % poorest based  on averagc
expenditure  in 1995)  expenditure  in 1994-98)  expenditure  in 1994-98)
Poverty  t-stat.  Poverty  t-stat.  t-stat.  Poverty  t-stat.  t-stat.
Rate  SE  (1)  Rate  SE  (4)  (4)-(1)  Rate  SE  (8)  (8)-(4)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)
Whole  sample  0.200  0.001  n/a  0.200  0.001  n/a  n/a  0.100  0.000  n/a  n/a
Age  Groups
0-15  0.243  0.011  3.8  0.245  0.010  4,4  0.3  0.130  0.008  3.9  1.3
16-30  0.178  0.011  -2.1  0.167  0.011  -3.0  -1.0  0,081 0.009  -2.1  -0.3
31-50  0.183  0.008  -2.2  0.178  0.008  -2.6  -0.5  0.087  0.006  -2.1  -0.6
51-64  0.169  0.015  -2.1  0.159  0.015  -2.8  40.8  0.073  0.011  -2.4  -0.8
65+  0.237  0.017  2.1  0.262  0.017  3.6  1.4  0.134  0.014  2.5  0.3
Access to land
No  0.217  0.016  1.0  0.245  0.016  2.9  1.9  0.127  0.014  2.0  0.5
Yes  0.195  0.005  -1.0  0.185  0.005  -2.8  -2.2  0.091  0.005  -2.0  -0.5
Own Automobile
No  0.238  0.005  8.2  0.240  0.005  8.4  0.3  0.123  0.003  8.0  1.2
Yes  0.081  0.014  -8.3  0.072  0.013  -10.0  -0.6  0.027  0.008  -8.9  -1.2
Household  typologv
Single  parent with child(ren)  0.222  0.034  0.6  0.221  0.032  0.7  0.0  0Q110  0.024  0.4  0.0
Other family  with child(ren)  0.216  0.007  2.0  0.211  0.007  1.7  -0.6  0.108  0.005  1.6  0.7
Single  elderly male  0.156  0.065  -0.7  0.144  0.061  -0.9  -0.3  0.041  0.032  -1.8  -0.9
Single  elderly femnate  0.266  0.032  2.A  0.333  0.032  4.2  2.1  0.193  0.026  3.5  1.6
Multiple  elderly  0.157  0.022  -2.0  0.155  0.023  -2.0  -0.1  0,075  0.017  -1.4  -0.2
Other family  without children  0.152  0.018  -2.8  0.142  0.014  4.0  -0.6  0.057  0.010  -4.2  -1.8
Number  of Children under  15
Zero  0.166  0.011  -3.2  0.172  0.010  -2.8  0.6  0.083  0.008  -2.1  -0.5
One  0.195  0.016  -0.4  0.156  0.015  -2.9  -2.6  0.071  0.010  -2.9  -0.9
Two  0.211  0.017  0.6  0.229  0.020  1.5  1.1  0.111  0.014  0.9  -0.3
Three or more  0.346  0.046  3.2  0.373  0.045  3.9  0.7  0.226  0.035  3.6  1.6
Number of income  earners
Zero  0.377  0.058  3.1  0.365  0.064  2.6  -0.2  0.184  0.046  1.8  0.1
One  0.219  0.019  1.0  0.253  0.018  3.0  2.4  0.160  0.016  3.7  2.8
Two  0.197  0.012  -0.3  0.189  0.012  -0.9  -0.8  0.080  0.007 -2.7  -2.6
Threeormore  0.176  0.015  -1.6  0.162  0.014  -2.7  -1.1  0Q078  0.010  -2.1  -0.4
Gender  of household  head
Male  0.188  0.004 -3.0  0.188  0.004  -3.0  0.1  0.092  0.003  -2.6  -1.0
Female  0.267  0.021  3.2  0.258  0.019  3.1  -0.4  0.141  0.016  2.6  1.0
Labor market  status  of household  head
Employed  0.188  0.006  -2.1  0.179  0.006  -3.5  -1.3  0.086  0.005  -2.8  -1.1
Unemployed  0.267  0.033  2.0  0.310  0.039  2.8  1.1  0.174  0.030  2.5  1.0
Retired  0.207  0.020  0.3  0.235  0.019  1.8  1.7  0.127  0.015  1.8  1.0
Other  0.247  0.042  1.1  0.207  0.038  0.2  -1.1  0.097  0.028  -0.1  -0.3
Age  & education  of household  head
16-30 High  school or less  0.189  0.033  -0.3  0.234  0.039  0.9  1.2  0.102  0.026  0.1  -0.7
16-30 Technical/vocational  0.224  0.044  0.5  0.180  0.043  -0.5  -1.0  0.086  0.025  -0.6  -0.2
16-30Higher  0.100  0.066  -1.5  0.015  0.017  -11.0  -1.3  0.000  0.000  n/a  n/a
31-50 High  school or less  0.233  0.018  1.8  0.252  0.016  3.3  1.1  0.138  0.012  3.2  1.3
3  1-50  TechnicalUvocational  0.202  0.021  0.1  0.201  0.021  0.0  -0.1  0.102  0.016  0.2  0.2
31-50 Higher  0.137  0.024  -2.7  0.085  0.021  -5.6  -2.3  0.020  0.009  -8.8  -2.1
51-64 Highschool or less  0.199  0.029  -0.1  0.181  0.025  -0.8  -0.8  0.075  0.017  -1.4  -1.0
51-64 TechnicaVvocational  0.200  0.050  0.0  0.181  0.045  -0.4  -0.5  0.116  0.037  0.4  1.2
51-64 Higher  0.089  0.031  -3.6  0.067  0.029  -4.5  -0.9  0.041  0.018  -3.2  0.6
65+ High  school or less  0.278  0.028  2.8  0.334  0.027  4.9  2.2  0.172  0.024  3.0  0.3
65+ More than high school  0.071  0.033  -3.9  0.050  0.024  -6.3  -0.8  0.035  0.022  -2.9  0.7
Stibjective living  condition
Verybad  0.319  0.023  5.2  0.317  0.024  4.8  -0.1  0.154 0.017  3.2  -0.3
Bad  0.215  0.010  1.6  0.212  0.010  1.2  -0.4  0.111  0.008  1.5  1.0
Average  0.131  0.009  -7.5  0.127  0.009  -8.5  -0.5  0.055  0.006  -7.4  -1.8
Good or very good  0.074  0.017  -7.6  0.069  0.017  -7.8  -0.3  0.036  0.012  -5.2  0.2
Unreported  0.245  0.012  3.8  0.253  0.011  4.9  0.8  0.133  0.007  4.6  1.1
Quintile  in average  expenditure  (94-  98)
Bottom  0.646  0.023  19.5  1.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.500  nla  n/a  n/a
Second  0.191  0.021  -0.4  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a
Third  0.085  0.017  -6.9  0.000  n/a  n/a  nla  0.000  nla  n/a  nla
Fourth  0.050  0.010  -14.8  0.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  nla  n/a  n/a
Top  0.028  0.008  -22.8  0.000  n/a  n/a  nla  0.000  wa  n/a  n/a
Notes:  Demographic  characteristics  are measured  in the base period,  which is  1995 for Russia.  Expenditure  is adjusted  for family
size using the baseline equivalence  scale.  The t-statistics  in columns  (3), (6) and (10) show  whether  the poverty  rate for the
demographic  group is significantly  different from the national  average. The t-statistic in column (7) tests the difference between
columns (4) and (I) while the t-statistic in column (11) tests the difference  between  columns  (8) and (4).
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